Approved For Release 2003/06/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000500040018-2 # 5

SUGGESTED CURRENT TACTICS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT (PSB D-40, pare. 5)

AND

POLLOW-UP ON APRIL 16 SPRECE

- Maintaining free world unity (PSB D-40, pares. 5 b. (6) & (7),
 e. (1) & (2)(g)).
- a. Responding to Orbit "means deeds". If an armistice eventuates in Korea, that together with other tangible gestures (East Germany, note on Turkish straits, release of persons, etc.) will probably make it desirable to move a step beyond our "deeds not words" line. Our allies will tend to hold that a certain amount of Soviet "sincerity" has been evidenced. Where it is necessary to comment, we should fully maintain the generous spirit of the April 16 speech, avoid seeming to gradge or belittle any tangible step toward civilized relations. At the same time we should find ways of putting such "peace deeds" in perspective, by alluding to the lessons of the past and problems of the present, and perhaps by hoping that "one deed leads to another" and suggesting other steps that remain to be taken.

(In addition to comment, are there types of action which should be recommended here?)

b. Combatting elegrages. Though Stalin's death enhanced the possibility of exploitable conflicts developing within the communist camp, subsequent months have chiefly brought evidence of widening

differing views of the situation created by Stalin's death. Much of this contrast is probably due merely to the fact that we know a great deal more about our own troubles then about communist ones. It that very fact indicates a basis for concrete actions in relation to the free world, aimed at healing the sore spots that make disunity. Such actions are, for the time being, among the most constructive appartunities available for supporting the strategy of the President's April 16 speech and PSE D-40. The actions in question should aim at changing the following foreign states of mind particularly:

- (1) Doubts about the ability of the President to speak for the country, arising from conflicting trends in Washington.
- (2) Belief that the United States is hysterical and lacks subtlety in dealing with the communist threat, at home and abroad.
- (3) Belief that current acts which restrict foreign trade are more indicative of the real direction of American policy than Administration pronouncements in favor of strengthening free world economies and increasing trade.
- (4) Resentment against other restrictions on free mutual relationships, such as travel and exchange of information.

- 2. Regaining the initiative. The preceding paragraph is defensive in purpose and reflects a general feeling that we have lost the initiative. If it could be captured again, as it was on April 16, that should contribute heavily to both free world and communist orbit aspects of our strategy (RSB D-40, para. 5 c.(1)). Bermuda offers a natural occasion, but the difficulties are very great. What major proposals can we make that would probably disunite orbit policy-makers while uniting the free world scalition?
- 3. Other wave of promoting communist disunity. How should the following principles from D-40 be currently implemented: (Para. 5 c.(2)(a) thru (f) & (h), and d.(2))
- a. "We should confront the untried regime with other stimuli apt
 to provoke internal arguments—e.g., occasions requiring decision, or
 failures leading to recrimination— but avoid threats or sabre-rattling."
- b. "We should plague it with doubts-e.g., about reliability of key individuals and groups."
- e. "We should foster internal antagonisms by other suitable means, such as fostering nationalistic feelings."
- 6. Whe should combine 'carrot' and 'stick' both in direct support of the main effort and in executing the other supporting efforts. An essential feature of the strategy of choice is a 'push-pull' situation, combining pressures and inducements which show the disadvantages of a choice contrary to our interests and the advantages of one which is favorable."

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
- e. <u>Thestuntions</u> in direction and emphasis (e.g., between carrot and stick) should be used as an added means of confusion except where steadiness of tacties is desirable for a special reason."
 - f. We should probe for vulnerabilities in the Soviet system.
- g. We should exploit the possible weakening of ties between the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world due to the absence of any outstanding figure of stature, experience and ideological provess as the new leader of world communism.*

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- We should extempt to erents the impression that pressure from the free world under U.S. leadership has led to whatever smalleration has conserved.
- 2. Grange and nations who have received some benefit from the reversal should be encouraged to elemer for more consecsions no matter what they receive. They should in fact be encouraged to expect for more than the Seviets are likely to give.
- 3. Vithout scoffing at Seriet reversals where they are of real or imagined substance to the people concerned, seeds of suspicion should be some to raise doubts about future Seriet intentions. The second for inhumanity and deplicity of the impunionst Seriet release should not be allowed to fade alterether.



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